



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 36 NUMBER 11

Britain's New Foreign Policy

by William H. Stringer

Historically Britain has maintained its global influence by shrewd alliances, power balances and diplomatic coalitions. So it is not surprising that in this period of post-Suez reappraisal, Britain—coincident with a production drive on the economic front—is busily overhauling its foreign policy.

The new Tory regime of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan has already shown an encouraging amount of energy. The prime minister hopes to turn the public consciousness away from lingering anti-Americanism, defeatist talk of Britain's being "finished" and all such frustrations, and toward an earnest effort to "put the Great back in Britain."

In foreign policy Whitehall recognizes that the abortive Suez plunge proved that in the 20th century a nation with a conscience cannot use force against a weak country strategically located. Equally important, the British government has concluded that it cannot sustain its peak load of world-wide commitments, plus the expenses of the welfare state.

The welfare state cannot be trimmed by a Conservative regime any more than by a Labor government. But global commitments can be dropped or pruned, and defenses can

be cut. With little delay Prime Minister Macmillan has embarked on a realigned foreign policy which has these four goals: (1) less "go it alone"; (2) closer association, chiefly economic, with Western Europe; (3) development of Commonwealth ties; (4) rebuilding the Anglo-American alliance.

Looking for places to retrench, Mr. Macmillan sees the German garrison as exceedingly costly, while West Germany forges ahead of Britain in world markets. So Bonn has been advised that the four British divisions now stationed in Germany will be slimmed down, and two may be withdrawn altogether, unless West Germany increases its own payments for their maintenance.

Meanwhile, British Defense Minister Duncan Sandys, Sir Winston Churchill's son-in-law, has cut army strength, cancelled some jet fighter orders and may prune the defense budget of \$4.5 billion by as much as one-third. Money thus saved may eventually find its way into tax reduction and incentives to industrial expansion. Pounds saved in Germany can go toward promoting economic policy elsewhere—for example, foreign aid grants to Asian or Middle Eastern countries.

FEBRUARY 15, 1957

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
345 EAST 46TH STREET • NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK

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Simultaneously Britain is looking at the markets and trade prospects across the English Channel with renewed appreciation. Significantly two top posts in the cabinet are held by "good Europeans"—the prime minister himself, and Peter Thorneycroft, chancellor of the exchequer.

'Good Europeans'

Public opinion is by no means ready to submerge the British identity in some political European superstate. But Messrs. Macmillan and Thorneycroft are keenly watching the surprising progress being made by the "little Europe" group—comprising Italy, West Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg—toward building a "common market." This market would abolish trade barriers in an area inhabited by 160 million people.

Britain realizes this six-nation area would afford a big market for British goods. And its tariff wall might eventually exclude many British goods if Britain failed to join up. To avoid such a result Macmillan, as chancellor of the exchequer, last autumn put out a broader plan called the "free trade area," embracing 18 countries and 260 million people. In this area Britain would retain the right to give "imperial preference" to food imports from the Commonwealth—but the external tariffs of the various nations could differ. There are many obstacles to building either the common market or the more ambitious free trade area. But the lessons of Suez may well drive Britain and the Continent into

close economic, if not political, alignment.

This will not mean that Britain lavishes less care, tact or attention on its Commonwealth commitments than in the past. The evolving association of nations known as the Commonwealth will soon number more countries with dark-skinned people than countries with white-skinned people. Fortunately for Britain the advantages of belonging to this world-wide association of traders, bankers and like-purposed nations is still apparent, even after Suez, to the newer Asian members as well as to the Anglo-Saxon contingent.

The rebuilding of the unwritten Anglo-American alliance is a prime concern of the Macmillan government. Mr. Macmillan will go to Washington if invited, and Washington comment indicates that an invitation will be extended one of these days. President Eisenhower, who missed an opportunity to say something friendly in his State of the Union message, did dispatch a letter of "warmest congratulations" to Macmillan when he became prime minister.

There now will be new ambassadors, and evidently effective ones, in both London and Washington. At the lower echelons of the Foreign Office and State Department it is insisted that consultations never ceased. Certainly officials are conferring back and forth daily regarding NATO, economic affairs, the Baghdad pact and other matters of common concern.

In the Middle East the British

have no intention of being counted out. British oil holdings in the Persian Gulf are still secure. Britain's relations with Baghdad pact signatories will be resumed when the current necessity for Britain to "lie low" has passed. If the Eisenhower Doctrine means business—and London is willing to believe that it does—Britain can play the role of junior partner in many development schemes, even as its oil payments have been recently helping Iraq to embark on irrigation and hydroelectric projects.

Britain's Economic Position

Basically Britain's economic position is by no means disastrous. The run on sterling has been halted. Whereas the motorcar industry is in some trouble, export orders cram the books in the engineering and capital equipment industries—orders for mills and factories, bridges and generators, docks and cranes and atomic power stations.

The next few months of oil stringency will not be easy. But the Macmillan regime, possessing a comfortable majority in Parliament, is in no mood to go to the country in a general election. Given a quick reopening of the Suez Canal, no new threats to the pound, and a minimum of strikes at home Britain should squeeze through the Suez crisis without major damage, its foreign policy realigned and streamlined.

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Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 E. 46th St., New York 17, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • BROOKS EMERY • MRS. W. HOUSTON KENYON, JR. • JOHN MARSHALL • PHILIP E. MOSELEY • PAUL H. NITZE • MARGARET PARTON • STEPHEN H. STACKPOLE • ANNA LORD STRAUSS. JOHN W. NASON, President; VERA MICHELE DEAN, *Editor*; NEAL STANFORD, *Washington Contributor*; FELICE SOLOMON, *Assistant Editor*. • The Foreign Policy Association contributes to the public understanding by presenting a cross-section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors. • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. RE-ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N.Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.



Is Israel Here to Stay?

There is one basic question at the root of all the trouble in the Middle East: Is Israel here to stay? Answer that, and boundary disputes can be settled. Answer that, and economic conflicts can be resolved. Answer that, and racial and religious disputes can be adjusted.

But there must be a clear answer—and an answer that is unanimous. Today the crisis in the Middle East, stripped of hate and fear and demagoguery, arises from the fact that the area is divided on this question, and so is the world. Israel says it is here to stay—and will fight to prove it. The United States says Israel is here to stay—and implies it might fight to assure this but will not say so flatly. Other nations also say Israel is here to stay—but promise nothing to make sure it does. The United Nations, which created Israel, might be expected to fight for its offspring—but it has given no promise and so far lacks the necessary machinery.

But if there are some powerful nations which say, and believe, that Israel's sovereignty is inviolable, there are other—and some geographically closer—nations which declare openly and emphatically that Israel must go. To put it bluntly, either Israel must agree to commit national suicide, or its Arab neighbors must accept it as a permanent political entity.

Under the circumstances all current efforts to solve Middle East problems are only palliatives. Attempts to settle boundaries cannot accomplish much as long as one party to boundary disputes is determined the other should have no boundaries at all. Moves to alleviate economic troubles can never result in improve-

ments when one side insists the other should have no economy at all.

U.S. Policy a Compromise

United States policy toward Israel—under Democrats as well as under Republicans—is a combination of fact and fiction. It is a compromise between principles and expediency. Washington asserts that Israel is, should be, and must be. But it will not guarantee any particular Arab-Israeli borders—that is, it will not do so unless Israel and its Arab neighbors agree on their borders, which is at present impossible. Or it will guarantee Israeli frontiers if the UN will do the same—but the UN has some members who refuse to admit that Israel even exists.

Students of the Arab-Israeli conflict are convinced that it is not enough for the United States to support UN resolutions. They have been ignored in the past; they are ignored today. They are effective when the parties to a dispute observe them; they are inoperative when the parties decide to ignore them. If the United States is to have the same code of conduct for its friends as for its enemies, it should insist that both friend and enemy observe its principles; otherwise it is only punishing its friends while leaving its enemies untouched. It has made new friends of the Arabs by insisting that its old friends—Britain, France and Israel—observe UN resolutions; but it has disappointed its old friends by doing nothing so far to enforce Arab compliance with UN resolutions.

The United States is prepared to pour dollars into the Middle East for economic projects that have vast potential for good. But it finds its ef-

orts hampered by the bitter rivalries between the various governments in the region. Certain local assistance is possible, but any river system projects and refugee resettlement programs must be accepted by feuding regimes and hostile officials before they can be carried out effectively.

Theoretically, and actually, the United States holds that Israel should withdraw to its preaggression borders. But it is increasingly aware that the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba should be covered by special provisions. Someone must see to it that these areas never again become points of contention between Arab and Jew.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has let it be known he is not averse to seeing the UN Emergency Force now in the Middle East develop into a more or less permanent body. The purpose of such a force is to keep the warring parties apart. But here again, United States efforts and interests are only palliatives. Not until Washington or the UN can get the rival parties to sit down together—in effect, to recognize each other—and discuss their differences is there any chance of a permanent settlement.

As it now is, the Arabs won't sit down with the Israelis, even to disagree. They say that since they do not recognize Israel's existence they cannot recognize a spokesman for a nonexistent state.

To sum up, the Arabs won't accept Israel as a political entity; the Israelis won't conveniently disappear. Once this problem has been solved, all other problems of the area will be soluble.

NEAL STANFORD



How Can UN Be Strengthened?

FOR those who believe that the world needs the United Nations, recent international crises raise disturbing questions concerning its ability, as now constituted, to serve the functions which it was intended to serve. What can the UN do about Hungary? about the Suez Canal? about the Middle East?

UN Not What It Should Be

Current developments fit no one's concept of what the UN should be. It is not consonant with the role of the international organization that Hungary or Egypt—or any other state—can deny admittance to UN officials and that the UN can only stand on the sidelines and shout recriminations. Or that Israel and the Arab states should be able to engage in constant shooting at each other in disregard of numerous UN resolutions. Or that Egypt should be able to defy the Security Council and blockade the Suez Canal and then take this vital waterway under its nationalist control. Or that, on the other hand, Britain and France, intervening to do what the UN could not or would not do, should be condemned by the UN, although the United States, under comparable circumstances, had acted independently of the UN in Greece, with NATO, and in Korea. And now the United States under the Eisenhower Doctrine claims to serve the United Nations by shutting the U.S.S.R. out of the Middle East, although this action could not possibly obtain enough votes in either Security Council or General Assembly to support it.

All this is very confusing. Saddest

of all, in none of these controversies does anyone think of making use of law or judicial settlement.

The principal reason why such inconsistency is possible is the method by which the UN reaches its decisions. As an institution it was given no more authority than to talk and make recommendations. The UN is simply machinery through which the sovereign states who are its members can act if they can agree to act. In this sense the UN is indispensable, but people want and expect it to do more than this.

And yet, we cannot afford to give more power to the UN so long as it maintains its present decision-making process. Decisions are reached by political vote based on "sovereign equality," and justice falls between the stools of a veto in the Security Council and an anticolonial majority in the General Assembly. To give but one example, whether right or wrong, what chance had Britain and France in the Suez situation?

Irresponsible Majority

Granted equality of voting, the General Assembly is at present controlled by a majority of small and irresponsible states—irresponsible in the sense that each is too weak to contribute to implementation of the decisions which they may take. Of the 76 members reported for the 1956 budget, 60 pay less than 1 percent; 28 of these pay no more than 0.1 percent; and 14 pay the lowest unit, 0.04 percent. The United States pays a third of the budget and has one vote; the 20 Latin American states all together pay less than 6

by Clyde Eagleton

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percent but have 20 votes; the five great powers pay 70 percent of the budget but have less votes than six Arab states which together contribute 0.8 percent. There are altogether 23 Arab-Asian-African votes, to which can always be added 10 Communist votes and usually the 20 votes of the Latin American states, which can be counted on for anything directed against a colonial power; and a number of others, including the United States, which would frequently join in.

The states in this majority resent, with some justification, the domination long exercised over them by the colonial powers and by the white race, and their interest is primarily the negative one of swatting the colonial powers in every possible way. Their feeling is that if a given people can be freed from the colonial power now ruling it, all problems are solved. They do not concern themselves with other oppressed peoples, nor with the future of those—for example, Libya and Indonesia—whom they free to make their own way under difficult economic circumstances. But if the UN should have to support these newly independent states, the anticolonial nations would pay little of the cost involved. The American people have been thinking along the same lines as the Afro-Asian bloc, but we should bear in mind that the United States, too, is a colonial power and that it, too, is a great nation and a representative of the white race.

The attitude of this UN majority is understandable. This attitude

(Continued on page 86)

by Quincy Wright

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THE United Nations could be strengthened by four approaches which do not involve amendment of the United Nations Charter.

(1) Reduction of the Influence of Crusading Ideologies in International Relations

The major obstacle to effective action by the United Nations in the political field has been the division of the world between the ideologies of Marxist communism and democratic liberalism.

This division has encouraged the development of rival "collective self-defense" blocs—NATO and Warsaw—each suspected of aggressive intentions by the other. The results have been extreme instability of the power equilibrium, mutual fears of attack, an arms race, increasing international tension, inability of the veto-ridden Security Council to function, establishment of blocs in the General Assembly distorting its reflection of world public opinion, an absence of the spirit of tolerance called for by the Charter, incapacity of representatives of the principal states to examine international problems on their merits, and involvement of most international conflicts in the "cold war," which makes their peaceful solution exceptionally difficult.

This situation has been partly ameliorated by some reduction in Soviet tyranny and expansionism since the death of Stalin, by the common conviction manifested at the Geneva "summit" conference in 1955 that hydrogen war would be so suicidal that no government is likely voluntarily to embark upon it, and by the rise of independent nationalism

above ideologies, evidenced by "Titoism" in Yugoslavia, by the developments in Poland and Hungary, and by declarations of the Soviet Union, Communist China and the United States in the autumn of 1956.

This trend toward decentralization and internal restraints in the great alliance systems and toward the reduction of the international influence of ideologies presents new opportunities for the United Nations. This was illustrated by the initiative that the Security Council, the General Assembly and the secretary-general were able to take to stop hostilities in the Middle East and to unite world opinion on the Hungarian episode in the autumn of 1956.

The General Assembly might discharge its function of "initiating studies and making recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation" (Art. 13) by examining the obstacles to co-operation arising from the development of ideological blocs, propaganda, and misunderstandings hostile to the peaceful coexistence of nations.

The General Assembly might also exercise supervision over regional arrangements and defense alliances to give assurance that their aims and practices are in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. While the Charter expressly requires that measures for collective self-defense and the activities of regional arrangements be reported to the Security Council (Arts. 51, 54), it would seem that if the Security Council fails to function in this matter the General Assembly can

and should exercise supervision by calling for reports and recommending modification of agreements to assure that they are in conformity with the Charter.

Progress in disarmament, admittance of neutralized states and universalization of United Nations membership would also be helpful.

(2) Identification of the United Nations with the National Interests of Its Members

The exclusive identification of most people with the symbols of a particular nation or a particular ideology and exaggerated ideas of sovereignty tend to create the view in some states that the United Nations is, or may be, hostile to national interests. This view overlooks the fact that the original members would not have ratified the Charter and nonmember states would not have struggled to be admitted unless national governments generally believed that a functioning United Nations is in their national interest—a belief frequently expressed by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower.

The United Nations might contribute to identifying itself with national interests by a more effective public relations program, by expanding technical assistance programs, and by more care in avoiding encroachment upon the domestic jurisdiction of members by consulting the World Court on this issue unless hostilities require immediate action.

(3) Peaceful Solution of International Controversies and Conflicts

Improvement of United Nations procedures to discharge this important function would strengthen the organization.

The events of the autumn of 1956 suggest that the initiative and diplomatic skill of the secretary-general may be of great importance. The refusal of Hungary to admit Mr. Ham-

(Continued on page 86)

Eagleton

(Continued from page 84)

arouses the sympathy of Americans, but it makes difficult the solution of current problems and creates certain risks for us. It inclines the anticolonial nations toward cooperation with the Soviet Union, which we regard as the greatest threat to our security. Their recommendations in disputes would always be against the colonial powers.

Fortunately, the decisions which this majority can take are only recommendations. Responsible members dislike to disregard even recommendations, but they are forced to do so in situations where a majority political vote can override rights, misinterpret the Charter, and cause injustice. The great powers, on whom the UN depends, will have to oppose giving more power to the international organization—although it needs more power—until a fairer means of arriving at decisions is provided. And meanwhile, they cannot afford to give up the veto.

Some improvement could be made if members would be willing to submit their legal disputes to judicial determination, but the tendency is away from this procedure. Weighted voting might offer an answer, but the majority would not willingly surrender the equality of voting which now gives them control. The bitterness of the present controversy might be somewhat mitigated, and more impartial consideration might be given to issues in dispute, if criteria could be established for determining whether a nonself-governing territory, colonial or not, merits responsible independence.

In any case, under existing circumstances the members which carry larger responsibilities will sometimes have to oppose or to bypass the UN in decisions as they are now taken. The UN can be strengthened only

if these member states bring to bear on the present situation the weight and power they actually have in the community of nations.

Wright

(Continued from page 85)

marskjold raises the question of his right to diplomatic access to the governments of all members. Under the Charter the secretary-general is the chief administrative officer of the organization and is entitled to bring political problems before the Security Council. By practice he is the representative authority to make agreements with states in the name of the United Nations. The International Court of Justice has defined the United Nations as an "international person" with some of the powers of a state under international law. Many of the members send permanent diplomatic representatives to the United Nations. These circumstances would seem to justify the secretary-general in claiming diplomatic access to the governments of all members and in sending occasional, or perhaps permanent, diplomatic representatives to their capitals.

General Assembly recommendations have authorized a core of trained mediators available to states to assist them in the solution of controversies. Experience suggests that a single skilled mediator can contribute more to the pacific settlement of political controversies than a commission or committee composed of representatives of states. The latter are necessarily incapable of acting freely and rapidly in such a situation.

The General Assembly and Security Council might well revert to the League of Nations practice of assigning a *rapporteur* to formulate resolutions with the object of achieving consensus. The actual practice, by which partisans of one side seek to align the necessary majorities over

the opposition of the other side, has tended to exaggerate cold-war considerations, has prevented the Security Council from functioning effectively, and in the General Assembly, has subordinated the peaceful solutions of disputes to ideological propaganda and voting victories.

General Assembly procedures should better integrate impartial fact-finding, advisory opinions of the Court, mediatorial action, and diplomatic initiatives of the secretary-general, with a view to isolating the particular controversy from the degenerating influence of great-power rivalries, and to recommending a just and acceptable solution.

(4) Discouragement of Aggression

"To insure that armed force will not be used save in the common interest" is a major function of the United Nations. National decision-makers would be more likely to refrain from aggression and to unite against it if they knew exactly what constitutes aggression.

It seems clear that in the intent of the Charter, aggression refers to the use of armed force in international relations unjustified by defensive necessity, by invitation of the state in whose territory the force is used, or by authority of the United Nations itself. If this limited concept is accepted, it seems possible to work out a precise definition which attributes a use of armed force to a government, which distinguishes international from domestic uses, and which justifies international uses.

The procedure of first dealing with hostilities by provisional measures calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of force is contemplated by the Charter and has been generally followed by both the League of Nations and the United Nations. The obligations of members of the United Nations to observe such provisional measures whether by the Security

Council or by the General Assembly might be clarified by supplementary agreements.

If such measures fail to stop hostilities, or even if they succeed, United Nations police action may be called for as it was in the autumn of 1956 in the Sinai Peninsula.

The Collective Measures Committee, established by the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution of 1950, proposed an earmarking of forces by members for such emergencies. The capacity of the United Nations to discourage aggression would be aided by a per-

manent police force—perhaps financially supported by a small percentage of the military budgets of all members—and by the more certain availability of earmarked contingents contributed by member states in emergencies.

The ability of the General Assembly to discourage aggression would be increased if a general treaty were negotiated, and open to ratification by all members, committing the parties to earmark contingents and to accept Assembly recommendations for a cease-fire, for determination of

aggression and for utilizing such contingents. The Thomas-Douglas Resolution, introduced in the United States Senate in 1950, proposed such a supplementary agreement with a proviso that it would apply only if the General Assembly acted with a two-thirds majority including at least three of the principal powers.

Such an agreement would not only strengthen the United Nations directly but would reduce the need for such discriminatory and provocative special alliances as NATO, Warsaw, SEATO and the Baghdad pact.

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



Are 'Neutralists' Against U.S.?

The policy of the United States toward what is called neutralism has undergone a marked change since the Suez Canal crisis at the end of October. Before Israel and our Western allies, Britain and France, had attacked Egypt, the tendency in Washington was to assume that "he who is not with us is against us." Nations which, like India, tried to steer an independent course in world affairs and to avoid taking the side of the non-Communist coalition led by the West were suspected of leaning toward the Soviet bloc.

True, President Eisenhower at his June 7, 1956 press conference had expressed understanding of, and even sympathy for, the problems of the "neutralist" nations, reminding his listeners of the comparable problems faced by the young American republic in its early history. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, however, had described neutralism as "immoral" at the commencement exercises of Iowa State College on June 9, 1956; and Vice President Richard M. Nixon on two occasions, in Manila and in Karachi, during his tour of

Asia had made critical remarks about the position taken by India as well as other neutralist nations which had declined to join the United States-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

Yet when the Suez crisis occurred on October 31, the immediate response of the United States was to denounce the use of force by Britain, France and Israel, although all three declared they had been forced to act in defense of their national security. For a solution of this crisis Washington turned, not to any of the existing collective security systems of which it is a member, but to the United Nations, where it found itself acting on the same side as the U.S.S.R. in demanding a cease-fire. Since then, according to James Reston in *The New York Times* on January 27, "the United States Government is rather pleased with its new independence from Britain and France. It has been going its own way for a long time in the Far East. It is now 'going it alone' in the Middle East."

Does this "go-it-alone" course make the United States a "neutralist,"

as some observers have suggested? To answer this question we must define what "neutralism" means. If India, generally regarded as the ranking proponent of this attitude, is taken as an example, then neutralism, first of all, is not synonymous with isolation. In spite of the grave internal problems the Republic of India has grappled with since achieving independence in 1947, it has not hesitated to seek and exercise a role of leadership not only in Asia but also on the world stage.

Is U.S. Neutralist?

Nor does neutralism correspond to the concept of neutrality which the United States accepted before both world wars—if neutrality means avoidance of international political commitments. India is not only a member of the Commonwealth, which it did not leave after the Suez episode in spite of public outcry against Britain's conduct. It is also an active member of the United Nations and of other international agencies—and in this respect differs from Switzerland, a traditionally

neutral country which has refused to jeopardize its status, safeguarded by an international agreement, by joining the United Nations.

Neutralism, moreover, does not mean pacifism. Although India remains attached to the philosophy of nonviolence inherent in Hinduism and translated into political terms by Mahatma Gandhi, it maintains a small but well-trained army deployed along its northern borders.

What Neutralism Is

In essence, neutralism as advocated by India, means nonalignment with this or that bloc of nations, no matter how worthy their intentions, and freedom to choose whatever course may seem most desirable at a given moment from the point of view of national interest. That India, in spite of its advice to other nations about moral conduct, will act as it thinks best even if this means defiance of the United Nations was shown on January 26, when Kashmir's 1947 accession to India was legalized through its new constitution, contrary to the UN Security Council resolution of January 24. This resolution declared that such accession without the plebiscite promised by Mr. Nehru would not be internationally binding.

Thus neutralism might be described as pursuit of national interest qualified in greater or lesser degree

by cooperation with the United Nations, but with no commitments to collective security systems outside the UN such as SEATO, NATO or the Baghdad pact. The United States since October 31 has combined a policy of greater independence from its Western European allies with greater reliance on the United Nations. At the same time, President Eisenhower made it crystal clear in his second inaugural address on January 21 that he rejects isolationism, saying: "No nation can longer be a fortress, lone and strong and safe." But in contrast to India the United States continues to remain a member of extra-UN collective security blocs. The question now under discussion is the future significance of these blocs.

To give one example, NATO, according to some observers, is threatened by the withdrawal of French units to Algeria, Britain's plans for cuts in defense expenditures, West Germany's delay in building up its military forces and Greek-Turkish tension over Cyprus. Washington, however, believes that the Hungarian crisis has alerted Western Europe to the Russian threat and that NATO can be reinforced by nuclear weapons, including guided missiles.

Yet the simultaneous crises in Egypt and Hungary have also encouraged the spread of neutralist

sentiment. The feeling of impotence induced by the Suez episode has accelerated the movement toward European unity and has caused Britain and France to look more critically at the United States. The desire for independence, tempered by recognition of *realpolitik*, has made leaders in the Eastern European countries and in the Middle East seek security in detachment from great-power blocs. As a Polish writer put it, Gomulka's Poland wants to be "The India of Europe." There is talk that Germany might accept neutralization as the price of unification.

All this, before Suez, might have alarmed the United States. Yet President Eisenhower has held long private conversations with the arch-exponent of neutralism, Indian Prime Minister Nehru. The impression grows that if the United States cannot secure the allegiance of all non-Communist countries to the coalition it has been leading, it may settle for neutralism as the best possible alternative to these countries' outright alignment with communism. In short, instead of thinking that the neutralists are necessarily "against us," we may come to regard them as helpful to stabilization of the world community.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The sixth in a series of eight articles on "Decisions . . . 1957," a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

In this issue:

Britain's New Foreign Policy —	
W. H. Stringer.....	81
Is Israel Here to Stay? — N. Stanford.....	83
How Can UN Be Strengthened? —	
C. Eagleton.....	84
Q. Wright.....	85
Are 'Neutralists' Against U.S.? —	
V. M. Dean.....	87

In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Report —	
The Future of Kashmir, A. M. Rosenthal	

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